The Dicta Boelcke

Oswald Boelcke, 1916. From Wikipedia

Oswald Boelcke is considered to be the father of the German fighter air force in the Great War, and the first to attempt to formalise the rules for dogfighting and develop standardised tactics. While early in the war much of the air-to-air combat was between single machines and aviators saw themselves as lone hunters, as the sheer number of planes in the sky increased the emphasis shifted towards squadron tactics and teamwork. While Boelcke's rules for dogfighting the Dicta Boelcke is addressed to the individual pilot, he was more concerned with formation flying and fighting. The most famous of all aces, 'The Red Baron' Manfred von Richthofen was a student of Boelcke and continued to idolise his mentor after his death, even as his own tally of victories grew ever larger.

The Dicta Boelcke

Try to secure the upper hand before attacking. If possible, keep the sun behind you.

Advantages included speed, altitude, the element of surprise, and knowing the performance and capabilities of your aircraft and your foe. Boelcke demonstrated gaining advantages when he and his Jasta intercepted intercepted a flight of Entente bombers and escort fighters crossing the lines on 17 September 1916. Boelcke and his pilots circled high above the bombers using the sun to mask themselves, until the bombers and their observers were distracted by the destruction they were causing on the ground.

Always continue with an attack you have begun.

Rookie pilots would often succumb to fear and attempt to break and run from a dogfight. To do so would present the vulnerable tail to the foe, making for an easy victory. It was far better to stay in the dogfight and wait for the enemy to make a mistake or flee. To run would break the first rule and sacrifice most or all of the advantages a pilot may have had. An example of this would be in November 1916 when Manfred von Richthofen encountered the British ace Lanoe Hawker. Both pilots stuck rigidly to the second dictum, circling each other to try and get on each other's tail. When the spiral had brought their aircraft down near the German lines Hawker had the choice between landing and inevitable capture or attempting to flee, and in trying to escape was shot down by Richthofen.

Open fire only at close range, and then only when the enemy is squarely in your sights.

The difficulties of firing machine guns from an unstable gun platform at a fast moving target meant that long range fire at 1000m were mostly futile. Boelcke preferred to close to within 100m before opening fire, as once the rattle of his Maxims had alerted his target the element of surprise was gone, so better to make the most of the first burst. Limited ammunition supply also made choosing shots carefully essential.

You should always keep your eye on your opponent and never let yourself be deceived by ruses.

In a fast and swirling dogfight it was easy to lose sight of your foe. If a pilot 'lost' his adversary then the advantage had shifted, so it was important to focus on them and not be distracted. The chivalrous nature of many early pilots meant that to continue hammering a man already going down was 'unsportsmanlike', so a crafty pilot could feign an uncontrolled dive or spin to escape from a disadvantageous fight. It was also common for airmen to allow opponents to escape if it appeared they were out of ammunition or their guns had jammed, such as in mid-1917 when the French 'ace of aces' Georges Guynemer met Ernst Udet, and after an intense duel in which neither pilot could get the better of the other the Frenchman, perhaps noticing that Udet's guns were jammed, broke away from the fight with a friendly wave and let his opponent go to fly another day. Boelcke recognised that too many enemies were being allowed to escape to continue fighting, and taught his students to follow their targets down to make sure they were out of the fight or continue it if necessary.

In any type of attack, it is essential to assail your opponent from behind. 

If their target was crossing their flight path, an airman would need to 'lead' the shot and fire ahead of the moving target to compensate for it's speed. Few airmen could consider the velocity of a moving gun platform, the velocity of the bullets and the speed and direction of a moving target in the heat of a tangled dogfight. It was much better to line up the bullet stream with the target's direction, requiring little or no leading or deflection. A head-on attack however would expose one directly to the enemy's guns, at high speed that left little time to aim and shoot accurately. A head-to-tail attack was the best approach, from below when tackling two-seaters and bombers with rear-firing machine guns.

If your opponent dives on you, do not try to get around his attack, but fly to meet it. 

Continuing his theme of teaching pilots to overcome instinct or fear, Boelcke taught that turning to face an attacker could unsettle the situation or even force them onto the defensive. Even though climbing would reduce speed it was better to bring one's own guns to bear, and by increasing the relative velocity between the two machines reduces the window during which the enemy can fire. If both pilots miss their initial shots the diving attacker must now pull out of his dive, while the defender is now in a position to turn and counter attack with his own dive.

When over the enemy's lines, always remember your own line of retreat. 

When aerial navigation was done mostly by sight it was very easy to get confused and lost. If fleeing or damaged, it was critical to spend what little time a pilot had left airborne flying in the right direction, and a number were downed behind enemy lines because they lost their way. Taking regular note of landmarks could help a pilot get his bearings and make the difference between safety and captivity.

Tip for Squadrons: In principle, it is better to attack in groups of four or six. If fights break up into a series of single combats, pay attention that several comrades would not go after one opponent. 

The early aces prowled the skies alone. As more and more aircraft took flight it became standard for several reconnaissance planes to fly together, often escorted by fighters. The days of the lone hunt were over, but many rookie pilots still reached the front expecting to dash into battle alone like a valiant knight only to be overwhelmed by multiple enemies. Sometimes scolding his pupils for acting too independently, Boelcke drilled into them the importance of teamwork. By flying and fighting as a group the leader could concentrate on his target while his wingmen covered his tail.

As as the war in the air intensified battles could involve dozens of dancing machines. In such a mix-up it was important not to double up on opponents, especially when at a numerical disadvantage. The benefit of concentrated fire was outweighed by the fact that another enemy plane was somewhat unbothered and free to tail a wingman. Friendly pilots were as likely to get in each other's way as to hit the same target. Late in the war, teamwork became the key of survival and success. 

Oswald Boelcke reached the rank of Hauptmann (captain) and was instrumental in the development of German fighter tactics and the organisation of the Jagdstaffel, fighter or hunter squadrons, known as Jastas. Jasta 2 was later known as Jasta Boelcke and twenty-five aces flew with the squadron, including Richthofen and Erwin Böhme. On 28 October 1916 Boelcke began his sixth sortie of the day with three other pilots of Jasta 2 as well as Richthofen and Böhme, his two best. In his rush to get ready Boelcke failed to strap on his safety belt properly. Their patrol encountered No. 24 Squadron RFC, and a dogfight ensued between Jasta 2 and the British DH.2 fighters. Unaware of each other's positions (against Boelcke's own teachings on situational awareness) Boelcke and Böhme closed in on the aircraft piloted by Captain Arthur Knight, as Richthofen dived in on Knight's flight path while pursuing another plane flown by Lieutenant Alfred Edwin McKay. Boelcke swerved to avoid a collision and the fabric on the upper wing of his Albatross D.II was torn by Böhme's landing gear, and he struggled to regain control. His machine fell out of sight into a cloud and when it emerged again the top wing was gone. Boelcke succeeded in making a relatively soft crash-landing but his lap belt did not restrain him and he never wore a helmet when he flew. Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke, victor of forty aerial engagements, was killed at the age of twenty-five. The tactics and doctrine he had championed would have a lasting effect on the Jastas of the Luftstreitkräfte. Jasta 2 was officially named Jasta Boelcke in December after his death, which is retained by the squadron to this very day. 

After Boelcke was buried with full honours at his aerodrome in Cambrai the Royal Flying Corps dropped a wreath the following day, which read "to the memory of Captain Boelcke, a brave and chivalrous foe". Boelcke had been referred to as a 'Gentlemen Pilot' by a newspaper after he went to great lengths to deliver a letter by Lieutenant Geoffrey Formilli of the RFC, informing his family he was still alive. Formilli was hospitalised after the B.E.2c he and Lieutenant William Somervill were flying was shot down by Boelcke, who maintained contact with the two British pilots after they were downed and presumably captured. 

"I am after all only a combat pilot, but Boelcke, he was a hero."

Manfred von Richthofen